VL2 The Mind-Body Problem

Consciousness in scientific context = linked to attention, makes higherlevel cognitive operations possible

-> Reductionistic

-> Does not encompass the emergence and function of phenomenal experience „qualia“

-> Qualia are often misunderstood or negated in scientific discussions

- Awakeness vs. Deep sleep / coma

- General alertness vs. General inattentiveness (e.g. daydreaming)

- Focal attention

- Reflective, reportable state (metacognition) (e.g. you know what you have seen)

- Self-awareness (self-consciousness)(e.g. you know that you are an individual)

-Qualia (subjective experience) à different from the rest! Cannot be studied by Neuroscience

—> Access consciousness —> being conscious of something, “Knowing”

• related to focal attention

• can be operationalized —> defined

• can be implemented —> shown in physical/biochemical processes

• adaptivity —> evolutionary advantages can be explained

• Operationalization_

  • reactions on motivational, affective, phsysiological and endocrine levels

• Implementation

  • neural network performs damage detection

  • central and peripheral defense reactions

• Adaptivity

  • prioritizing to protect system from damage, advantage for survival and reproduction

—> phenomenal consciousness/qualia/sentience

• neuronal states are phenomenally different in their qualia

• intuitively often described as part of surrounding —> tomate is red

• why extra mile of producing qualia?

• no objective operationalisation

• no neural implementation —> can artificial networks experience qualia

• adaptivity —> natural selection operates on behavior, every cognitive process &behavior theoretically possible without qualia

• = Epiphenomenon

• societal & cultural phenomenon

• can exist separately from material structures

• do not exist

• same thing as neuronal states

• =neuronal activity from 1st person view

o   secondary phenomenon that is produced in the process of another primary phenomenon à this contradicts the law of Conservation of energy

• one should not consider the brain in isolation

• must take into account overall societal interactions and functions.

• but: People that grow up in isolation, they can see color and feel pain

• we do not start experiencing these qualia only in societal contexts

o   Proposes two Universes à physical and non-physical

o   It does not solve the problem but moves it to a mystical universe that is cannot be falsified

o   Contradicts occam’s razor

o   Cannot argue with people that do not believe they feel pain or happiness

o   These are just material correlates of subjective qualia

o   These neuronal states can exist without phenomenal consciousness e.g. in artificial neuronal networks

o   We believe robots cannot feel pain à therefore it cannot be the same thing

o   Spirit & brain are identical to one another but are different perspectives

o   Spirit = first person view and brain = third person view

o   First person view has no direct access from the outside perspective

o   Two versions of this theory

§  Hardware-oriented à neuronal processes can be qualia à problem: neurons do not differ from one another and are interchangeable

§  Software-oriented à functional states determine qualia