1. Economic Institutions and Development
Have a look at Figure 1. Can we infer that latitude is a good explanation for differences in per capita incomes between countries? Explain.
a) Latitude
Interpretation of strong correlations between geographical variables like latitude and income per capita
European had no immunity to tropical diseases during colonial period and colonies tended to be created in temperature latitudes
Thus the historical creation of economic institutions was correlated with latitude.
Today there is no causal effect of geography on prosperity today, though geography may have been important historically in shaping economic institutions
How do Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) define extractive institutions? What is the impact of such institutions on modern economic development?
b) Extractive Institutions
Extractive economic institutions are so structured to extract resources from many by the few and that fail to protect properly rights or provide incentives for economic activity
Extractive economic institutions are synergistically linked to extractive political institutions, which concentrate power in the hands of a few, who will then have incentives to maintain and develop extractive economic institutions for their benefit and use the resources they obtain to cement their hold on political power
These tendencies do not imply that extractive economic and political institutions are inconsistent with economic growth. On the contrary, every elite would, all else being equal, like to encourage as much growth as possible in order to have more to extract
Extractive institutions that have achieved at least a minimal degree of political centralization are often able to generate some amount of growth.
Briefly explain the idea of the Reversal of Fortune. How is it related to institutions?
c) Reversal of Fortune
The tropics in the Americas were thus much richer than the temperature zones
Making the places that were previously relatively wealthy in the Americas relatively poor
While the geography stayed the same, the institutions imposed by European colonists created a βreversal of fortuneβ
2. The Colonial Origins of Development
Acemoglu et al. (2001)1 attempt to measure the causal effect of institutions on economic performance. The baseline OLS model they estimate is as follows:
πππ¦π = Β΅ + π½1π π + ππβ²Ο + ππ
where π¦π is income per capita in country π, π π measures protection against expropriation, ππ is a vector of covariates and ππ is a random error term.
What does the coefficient π½1 measure? How would you interpret a negative sign of π½1? Please give a brief answer.
a) Β Ξ²1
It measures the coefficient of interest, the effect of institutions on income per capita
A negative Beta would express a negative impact and influence on the income per capita
Ξ²1 is a regression coefficient. It shows the contribution on the influencing variable Ri to the explanation of the target variable vi
If the factor changes by one unit, then the dependent variable changes by one unit
π½1 is expected to be biased in a standard OLS regression. Briefly mention at least two potential sources of endogeneity in this model and explain them.
b) Sources of Endogeneity
Endogenity = The presence of a correlation between regressor and cofounding term
Potential causes are for example
the omission of important explanatory variables
faulty measurement
simultaneity in the variables
serial autocorrelation with lagged dependent variables
self-section problems
In the first stage of a 2SLS regression, the authors model π π as π π = π + π½ππππ + ππβ²π + ππ, where ππ is a measure of historical European settler mortality. Name the exclusion restriction in this model. Name one significant threat to this exclusion restriction.
c) Exclusion Restriction
The exclusion restriction is that the mortality rates of European settlers more than 100 years ago have no effect on GDP per capita today, other than their effect through institutional development
The major concern with this exclusion restriction is that the mortality rates of settlers could be correlated with the current disease environment, which may have a direct effect on economic performance
Refer to Panel B of βTable 4 β IV Regressions of Log GDP Per Capitaβ in the paper. Does ππ appear to be a relevant instrument for π π? How can you tell?
d) Measure of historical European settler mortality
Looking at the values, a consistently negative significant influence between 0.43 and 0.59 on the model can be found
Accordingly, it can be concluded that Mi has a relevant influence on Ri. Adding one unit of Mi to the model decreases Ri between 0.43 and 0.59 units.
The authors find that the π½1 in 2SLS is higher than in the OLS regression. How do they explain this negative bias of the OLS?
e) Β 2SLS vs. OLS regression
the difference could be due to measurement error in the institutions variable by making use of an alternative measure of institutions, for example, the constraints on the executive measure
Using this measure as an instrument for the protection against expropriation index would solve the measurement error, but not the endogeneity problem
This exercise leads to an estimate of the effect of protection against expropriation equal to 0.87 (with standard error 0.16). This suggests that βmeasurement errorβ in the institutions variables is of the right order of magnitude to explain the difference between the OLS and 2SLS estimates.
3. Property Rights and Economic Development
Consider the model of Besley and Ghatak (2010).2 There is a single producer economy with no markets or any form of exchange where a farmer is endowed with a fixed quantity of land. The only variable input to production is the farmerβs effort π β [0,1], of which he has an endowment πΜ β€ 1. This yields output π΄ with a probability π^1/2 so that expected output is π¦ = π΄π^1/2. Assume that property rights are imperfect and that there is an exogenously given probability π β [0,1] of expropriation.
State the farmerβs maximization problem. What is the choice variable?
What is the farmerβs optimal choice of effort and how large are their corresponding profits?
How does the choice of effort depend on the risk of expropriation? Provide a formal answer and interpret your result.
Now assume that the farmer can devote π1 units of effort to productive purposes, while they can spend π2 units of effort on the reduction of the expropriation risk. The probability of expropriation then becomes π(1 β πΎπ21/2), with πΎ β [0,1]. Otherwise the model stays the same.
d) How does the farmerβs maximization problem change Interpret πΎ.
Find the optimal choice of π1 and π2.
How is the optimal choice of π1 and π2 affected by π?
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