Behavioral biases stem from
cognitive errors
emotional biases
Nicht alle Informationen analysierbar
Incorrect information processing
Use simple heuristics
Failure translate information into fully rational decisions
Emotional biases
How individuals see information
Emotional biases distinct from cognitive limitations involved when analyzing and processing information
=> roots of behavioral biases schwer zu entschlüsseln
Combination of cognitive errors and emotional biases
The 2 key results of prospect theory
Reference point thinking
Seperate stocks into winner and loser stocks
Gain realisieren
Loss halten
Loss aversion
Risk aversion in gain
Risk seeking in loiss
Was sagt der disposition effect aus
Und was müsste laut rational wealth maximizing investor behavior optimal sein
Winner stocks sold too early
Loser stocks held too long
Rational wealth maximizing investor behavior
Sell loser to reduce taxes
Hold winner
Disposition effect (odean, 1998)
PGR
PLR
grafic
PGR (Anteil realisierte Gewinne)
Realized Gains / (realized Gains + paper gains)
PLR (Anteil realisierter Verluste)
Realized Loss / (realized losses + paper Loss)
Disposition effect leads to?
higher tax burden while lowering returns
Disposition effect (ferris 1987)
=> 30 smallest NYSE and AMEX stocks according to their gains and losses
key result
Key result
positive abnormal trading volume for winner stocks
Negative abnormal trading volume for loser stocks
=> positiv zu früh verkauft
=> neagtiv zu lang gehalten
Nenne Gründe für den disposition effect
Harmfull?
Remedies against?
Self justification
Pride and regret
Tax burden steigt an
Winners outperfom losers
Example of sunk cost fallacy
Remedies against
Become aware of biases
Stop-loss orders in order to sell loser stocks automatically
Framing (Tversky, Kahneman; 1981)
gleicher Text nur negativ formuliert
200 lives saved
800 died
positive frame: risk avers
Negative frame: risk seeking
Pension plan investment (bernatzi/thaler 2002)
=> extremness aversion, es wird lieber die Mitte gewähltt
=> individuals have non stable preferences
Framing (Glaser 2007)
German students, forecast performance of stock, 2 groups (forecast stock price group; forecast stock return group)
return group are trend chaser
price group expect mean reversion
Return: negativ wird fortgeführt
Price: Trendwende
Overconfidence
driving skills (svenson 1981)
US: 93% halten sich für bessere Autofahrer als der mean
S: 69% halten sich für bessere Autofahrer als der mean
JLU Female: 60%
JLU Male: 77%
Overconfidence (Barber/Odean, 2002)
1607 investors switch from phone to online trading
Turnover rate increase from 70 to 120%
Handelsvolumen deutlich angestiegen
Performance gesunken
3 Gründe
Better than avg. effect (svenson 1981)
Miscalibration (russo/shoemaker, 1989)
Too narrow confidence intervals
Ilusion of control (barber/odean 2002)
People fell they can influence outcome
Excessice optimism
Related to illusion of control
People assign wskt to outcomes
“Of course is our marriage last forever“
Excessive trading (barber/odean 2000)
Portfolio transactions 66,465 investors
Empirical test of rational vs excessive trading due to overconfidence
rational prediction
Behavioral prediction
Rational
Active and less traders have same expected utility
Active traders must have higher gross returns to offset trading costs
Different in net returns predicted
Behavioral
Investors suffer from overconfidence trade excessively
Excessicve trading reduces expected utility
Net return of trader with high turnover should be less then turnover of less active trader
Viele Turnover -> less return
Key results
Net return sinkt bei viel Turnover
in 2001 same data: men tend to be more overcondifent than women
Overconfident tend to trend excessively
Key hypothesis: men trade more than women
Männer mehr turnover aber frauen höhere Renditen
Somit Hypothese bestätigt
underdiversification (Doskeland/Hvide 2011)
Aktien von Unternehmen bei denen man arbeitet
Rational prediction
rational predictions
Returns of expertise stocks highly correlated with return on human capital (poor hedging properties)
Investors should invest in expertise investments only if they posses value relevant information
=> expertise inverstments should have abnormally high returns
Behavioral predictions
Overconfidence affects experts and amateurs -> overconfidence in their expertise
Preference for expertise stocks based on ilusion of control, not on informational advantage
=> expertise investments unlikely to deliver positive excess returns
Why do people fail to learn from past mistake owing to overconfidence ?
3 biases
Self attribution bias
People learn to be overconfident
Hindsight bias
Ich hab es die ganze zeit gewusst!"
Confirmation bias
Ignore conflicting data
Representativeness
representativness heuristic
People focus on similarity of description to certain stereotypes
Economics of representativeness
Mental short cuts when processing information
assessment of probability substituted by judgment of similarity
Issues with representativness
Kann dazu führen dass man Basisinformationen vernachlässigt
Are stocks of good companies good investments (lakonishok 1994)
deciles of shares conditional on
Sales growth
P/E ratio (price earning ratio)
Comparison of future returns for two extreme deciles
Glamour (high growth) stocks
Value (low growth) stocks
=> key results
value more return 1 year and 5 year
good investment in vergangenheit heißt nicht good in Zukunft
Leute orientieren sich zu stark an vergangener performance
Problem?
Expensive buys in bull markets
Costly sells in declining markets
Representativness and investing (Benartzi 2001)
Hypothesis
Positive correlation between past returns and subsequent allocation
to company stock due to excessive extrapolation
Employees investing after having experienced the (best) worst 10-year-period
of own company stock performance invest (40%) 10% of discretionary
contributions into company stock
Elsberg paradox
Agents distinguish between risk (known probabilities) )and ambiguity (unknown probabilities)
Agents display aversion towards ambiguity
Ambiguity aversion distinct from risk aversion
=> Investors exhibit different degrees of ambiguity about distribution of asset returns and consider familar asset with lowest level of ambiguity
Familarity
People tend to overinvest in employer stock, expertise stock, familare firms, geographic close firm
Familarity leads to substantial portfolio underdiversification
Home bias
US 87% invested in US by 43% Marktkapitalisierung
Ger 73% by 3% Marktkapitalisierung
Familarity (Baltzer/Stolper/Walter 2015)
Local Bias
H1: Investors hold locally biased equity portfolios
H2: Local bias increases in times of rising stock market uncertainty
Ergebnis:
strong evidence of local bias
higher in urbanized area
east west heterogeneity
positve related to domestic stock
=> Familiarity bias leads to underdiversification
Mental accounting
“would you prefer lot more risk with some of your money or prefer take a little more risk with all your money“
DIe meisten wählen Option A -> Mental accounting
money in one mental account is not perfect subs in another account
makes it difficult for investors to diversification
violates principles of asset integration
inconsistent with modern PF theory
=> erschwert investoren Umsetzung von Diversifikation
pros
cons
Mental accounting -> Aktien werden einzeln betrachtet
Pro
einfacher zu betrachten
Planbarkeit
Con
Investment muss im Gesamten betrachtet werden -> Disposition effect
erschwert investoren Umesetzung von Diversifikation
gleichzeitiges Sparen und Kredit
was sind fixed effects?
Welche fixed effects neben ceo fixed effects gibt es noch?
dummy variable um nur x zu bewerten und keinen Einfluss haben
fixed effects werden einbezogen um zu berücksichtigen dass unbeobachtbare Eigenschaften auf y auswirken.
neben ceo fixed effects könnte es auch folgende fixed effects geben
firm fixed
firmenspezifische Eigenschaften wirken sich auf y aus
industry fixed
Branchen spezielle Eigenschaften wirken sich auf y aus
Anchoring
Orientierung an vorher gegebenen Wert
Anchoring Index (AI)
mean estimate(high anchor) - mean(low anchor)/ high anchor - low anchor
AI = 1 -> initial anchor
AI = 0 -> anchor ignored
Wheel of Fortune by Kahneman
manipuliertes Rad
Frage wird gestellt und Rad gedreht
Rad bleibt bei 10 oder 64 stehen und Antwort orientiert sich an der Zahl obwohl es damit nichts zutun hat
Kaustia/Alho/Puttonen (2008)
Q: anchoring effect in long term stock return forecasts? Expertise reduce bias?
300 financial market professionals from sweden and finland
Experiment 1
self generated anchor vs. external anchor
Treatment
group a: no anchor
group b: historical stock return was 4.5%
Experiment 2
High or low anchor:
A: high anchor
B: low Anchor
Ergebnis1:
Group A gibt 8.1 an
Group B lässt sich beeinflussen und gibt 4.6 an.
Ergebnis 2:
Experten weniger Anfällig für Anchor, bei beiden aber Anchor effect
example for human decision making
ultimatum game
A makes offer to B
B accept or reject
If accept
A receive c-x
B receive x
Ab >0 wäre es sinnvoll für B anzunehmen
in der 1. Runde geringe rejection rate, A bietet 0.37
in der 2. Runde hohe rejection rate, A bietet 0.32
=> A wird rationaler und B wird irrationaler
with industrialized countries
with indigenous peoples
industry:
LA rejection rate von 0, Jerusalem am höchsten mit 0.33, Allerdings LA auch mit 160$ gespielt und rest mit 10$
Indigenous:
fairer gespielt
-> Kulturelle Unterschiede beeinflussen das Spiel
dictator game (Forsythe 1994)
modification of ultimatum game
B can not refuse A’s offer
Die meisten haben B 0$ gegeben, da keine Ablehnung möglich war
im Ultimatum game liegt modus bei 2.5
=> Angst das B ablehnt, treibt Angebot nach oben
Fairness is not the only reason for the positive offers in ultimatum game
Peer effect
the influence of neighbors (hong/kubik/stein 2004)
high social people more likely to learn about investing than low social people => high social -> more likely to invest
Study design:
7500 households
stock market participation (Y/N)
social activeness
social households more likely to invested in stock market
households know neighbors or attend church higher probability to participate in stock market
RCT Studie
social households that lives with high stock market participants are even more likely to invest in stock market
the influence of neighbors (Ivkovic/Weisbenner 2007)
hypothesis
information about investing through word of mouse effect
stock purchase related to stock purchase made by neighbors
Ergebnis
10% increase purchase is associated with a 2% increasment in households own purchase of stocks from that industry
Effect even stronger for purchases of local companies
influence of coworkers on participation in 401k plan (duflo/saez 2002)
Idea
peer effect from co workers should influence paricipation in 401k plan
Finding
belonging to the same building is associated with participation rates
Herding
Menschen entscheiden wie die Allgemeinheit
SRI (social responsible investing)
Key principles
Types of SRI
investment strategy that considers financial returns and social/environmental good
key principles
investment with ethical principles
goes beyond profid: ESG Factors
Types
negative screening
positive screening (best in class)
ESG integration
impact investing
Riedl/Smeets 2017
Why do investors hold socially responsible mutual funds?
social preferences and social signaling explain socially responsible investment decisions
Riedl/Ruof/Smeets 2021
Individuals prefer more sustainable investments
Result
67.9% are in favor of expanding sustainable investments
majority of respondents choose to expand sustainable investing, even those who have negative return expactations or are uncertain about the return
Heeb/Kölbel/Paetzold/Zeisberger 2022
Do investors care about impact?
Investors gib up financial wealth to invest sustainably
driven by positive emotions regarding making an impact rather than by a calculative valuation of impact
value bases investing
value bases investor want to stay true to their values
investor accpet that investments and values are commingled
Zuletzt geändertvor 7 Monaten