1. Risk: Qualitative Definition and
2. Graph
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1. Risk involves hazard and uncertainty, both:
-hazard: -potential source of damage. Usually, some safeguards (Sicherheitsmaßnahmen) prevent occurrence (Ereignis) of hazard and its consequences
-uncertainly: chance that hazard translates from potential to actual damage
2. impact, probability
A and B systems: Ra = Rb, Xa<<Xb, Pa>>Pb, strategies to control risk?
kontrollieren!!!
A: Seek measures for mitigating (mildern) the hazard and protection the outside environment
B: Provide redundancy and improve reliability of components (prevention
Knowledge on risk is not sufficient (ausreichend)! Why?
1
…. This is:
One must keep track of hazard x to mitigate (mildern) and protect
One must keep track of probability p to prevent
This is: defence-in-depth approach
System may involve n undesirable events:
Composite Risk (formula):
structuralist defence-in-depth (traditional)
critism of structuralist defence-in-depth
-credible worst-case scenarios with its associated consequences x*
-safety protection of system is designed against such worst case scenario
-”If a plant were designed to withstand the worst-case scenario, then it would be protected against any credible accident”
-Subjective (what is worst case…)
-Extreme conservatism, particulary for those cases where accidents may have huge consquences
Current approach: rationalist defence-in-depth
Curve
-Examines (untersucht) all feasible (machbare) scenarios and its consequences
-Probability of those scenarios is a key element of handling uncertaintly
Simultaneos consideration of p and x leads to Farmer Curve
-scenario devided: acceptable and unacceptable risk
-more emphasis (Schwerpunkt) on consequences leads to steeper slope (Steigung)
General Remarks
-First step of risk analys
-Output
-key issue
-Qualitativ analysis relies on?
First step of risk analysis: Identifying hazards associated with the operation of a system
Output a list of potential dangers (accident initiators), with certain probability that can bring significant consequences
key issue= Identification of accident initiatior // when not inclued at this stage, most likely neglected (vernachlässigt) for entire analysis
Qualitativ analysis, relies on personnel involved in desgin, operation, maintenance of systems
Hazard Identification
Common methologies (4)
-Hierarcical Trees
-System Identification of Release Points (SIRP)
-Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
-Hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP)
Hazard Identification: Hierarchical Trees
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GUCKEN OB NOCHMAL BEHANDELT???!?!
-Structural logic tree
-Deductive, allows identify initiating cause
-Origin in nuclear industry, widely applied in nuclear and aerospace industry
SIRP
4
Systematical Identification of Release Points
-Identification of most likely point of failure based on historical data
-historical data used to assign probabilities
-Expert opinion used to dicard cases with irrelevant consequencenes
-Reference break points are defined by grouping
FMEA
… and main stages
-Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
-Qualitative, inductive approach
-Identifies failure modes which may lead to interruption of operation or significant accidents
Stages:
-decomposing a system into subsystems
a) identify operation modes( start up, regime, shutdown, maintenance
b) identify configuigurations (valves or pumps on/ off)
-compile information of subsystem in a table: recordng failure modes of subsystem and their consequences (on other componentes and/ or whole system)
FMECA
Variant of FMEA: Failure Mode, Effect, and Criticaly Analysis:
citicality is assigned to each failure mode considering [ranking]
ranking:
safe: no relevant effects
marginal: partially degradad system. no demage to humans
critical:system damaged with effects over humans. No protective measures (Schutzmaßnahmen): accident could lead to loss of system and serious human consequences
catastrophic: loss of system and serious cansequences on humans
What to say about FMEA / FMECA?
Conducting (durchführen, leiten) FMEA/FMCA is demanding, however it can be assisted by software tools
FMEA is most useful for constructing fault trees
FMEA is useful for palanning maintenance
FMEA: Table
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component, failure mode, effect on system, criticality (defined steps), failure frequency, detection method, compensation promissions
Hazard and operability analysis (HAZOP)
Qualitstive approach that combines deductive (search for cause) and inductive aspects (consequnce analysis)
It attempts to identify events initiating an accident
focusus on processes rather than components (as FMEA does)
originated in chem. process industry
leads to table: process anomalies with associeated causes and consequences
Analysis steps of HAZOP
1) decomposing in independent units, identifying operation modes of units
2)Identify possible deviations for each unit (Abweichungen): involves
a)identifying in / out fluxes and process variables
b)List functions of unit
c)attach keywords to the process varibles and unit functions that account for deviations from nominal conditions.
3) Identify causes and consequences for each process deviation, Consider effects in other units to detect domino phenomena
Analysis/Table of HAZOP
Left to right: Guide word (high, low), deviation, possible cause, consequeces, probosed measure
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